The footage of anti-Turkey protests in which the Turkish flag was burned in Jubbaland State's riverine town of Doollow, followed by similar protests in Puntland State's coastal town of Eyl, have been at the fore of Somali political discourse lately. Protestors expressed their anger at Ankara's increasingly interventionist and partisan role in internal Somali politics.
Two incidents prompted these latest rounds of protests: Doollow's protest was ignited by the Federal government's politically motivated assassination attempt on Gen. Mahad Abdirahman, the former MP and former commander of the Somali Custodial Corps in the town, someone the government blames for what has now become a quotidian fight for the control of Baidoa, interim capital of South West State. The bombing which he survived, is heavily rumoured to have been carried out by a Turkish F-16 fighter jet.
The protests in Eyl were the result of Turkish navy forces killing at least four fishermen near Eyl while "going after 'pirates.'"
Pro-Turkey Somali voices panicked and reacted angrily to the demonstrations and cratering support for Ankara, framing them as a "joint Emirati-Israeli machination." In their immediate aftermath, Turkey proposed a "Strategic Communications Partnership" program aimed at "combating disinformation" with the Federal government.
But this charged sentiment has percolated through to the intellectual and commoner alike. In his latest essay, prominent Somali intellectual and current Senator, Abdi Samatar, assesses that Turkey is but a neo-colonial power that shrouds its imperial ambitions in "humanitarianism" and "Islam." He argues that all along, common faith was Turkey's trojan horse for long-term interests and exploitation.
In a bid to elicit sympathy for Turkey and defend it from the demonstrators' ire, the Speaker of the Somali parliament, a figure renown for his pro-Turkish zeal, fabricated a bogus history altogether: He claimed that Turkey was unstintingly on Somalia's side in its war with Ethiopia in 1977. This is untrue: Turkey didn't in any meaningful way come to Somalia's aid during that war. In fact, it was two whole years after Somalia was defeated in the '77 war, in 1979, when Turkey even opened its first embassy in Mogadisho.
So, how did we get here?
Honeymoon Phase... Over?
Turkey's arrival in Somalia came at a time when the country was in a full-blown humanitarian catastrophe: the 2011-2012 period marked one of the country's most devastating famine episodes in recent history. The U.N. estimated it to have claimed the lives of about 260,000 Somalis.
In arriving in Mogadisho and shining a light on Somalia's humanitarian plight, then Prime-minister Erdoğan and his nation reigned supreme in the Somali conscience. In his honour, many households gave their newborn sons the distinctly un-Somali-sounding name of Erdoğan.
Somalis, who for centuries have survived on the treacherous terrain they inhabit, have learnt to view even friends with some degree of skepticism. They understood well then that no state, not even Turkey, would agitate for their helping free of charge. That is why Turkish firms taking over the management of both of Mogadisho's airport and seaport; Turkey establishing its largest military base abroad outside Mogadisho; and their building a satellite launch facility in Adale to advance Turkish aerospace capabilities, even with all the perils this could bring to Somalia, weren't met with any real acrimony.
Lopsided Agreements
In 2024, the two governments signed an offshore oil exploration deal in Somali waters. Details about its contents remained inaccessible to the public until about a year later, when the outline of the agreement was obtained by the media. Surprisingly, Somali MPs themselves, though they had ratified the agreement, weren't shown the full document.
Opposition figure and MP Abdirahman Abdishakur, tragically remarked that "in order to see and know about the full document, Somali MPs like himself were awaiting their Turkish counterparts' session in which they would discuss the deal and its tenor."
What little details the Somali public read in the media had them in shock: the deal appeared to be a lopsided, exploitative agreement, in which the dominant partner had their way with the dependent one.
This was shortly followed by a "marine protection pact" which gave Turkey the freedom to patrol all Somali waters, and a favourable "fishing agreement."
Egypt: A Cautionary Tale
Somali-Egyptian relations go back a millennia. In more recent history, Egypt played a palpable role in advocating for Somali independence, with figures like Mohamed Kamal El-Din Salah heavily featuring in calls for Somali independence. It cost him his life, as he was assassinated in 1957 by pro-colonial Somali elements, for his unrelenting devotion to Somali independence.
Post-independence too, Egypt continued being a close ally and in different forms, came to Somalia's aid in both of its wars with Ethiopia in 1964 and 1977.
Egypt remained a mainstay in Somali matters until 1997 when, in a Somalia in the middle of civil war, it made the fatal mistake of firmly entrenching itself in the camp of one of the warring factions. Initially, Cairo was hosting broad mediation talks between the various armed groups and somewhere along the way, the process broke down, and Egypt lost its appetite for a consensus agreement. It decided to back the rushed formation of a government wholly consisting of the U.S.C., one of the factions, and the U.S.C. proceeded to form a government whose president and prime minister were both of it.
This error in judgment was costly for Egypt: Hanging its hat on a government with limited legitimacy outside Mogadisho led to it permanently losing its image of the "honest broker" in Somali matters ever since.
The parallels are impossible to ignore here: Ankara appears to have put all its eggs in the current Federal administration's basket, backing it all the way through, with even the deployment of military might against its political opponents. Opposition figures have voiced Turkey's bias in election talks, and dragged their feet whenever Ankara proposed to mediate between them and the Federal government.
The lesson here is clear, as Egypt's 1997 blunder offers a cautionary tale: in Somali politics, hedging is imperative and not optional. And partisan entrenchment, even if merely political, let alone when coupled with military intervention, might in the short-term appear advantageous, lulling its beneficiary. But down the line, it risks irreversible marginalization and might lead to permanent irrelevance.
